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Abstract—Modern botnets rely on domain-generation algo-
rithms (DGAs) to build resilient command-and-control infras-
tructures. Recent works focus on recognizing automatically
generated domains (AGDs) from DNS traffic, which potentially
allows to identify previously unknown AGDs to hinder or disrupt
botnets’ communication capabilities.
The state-of-the-art approaches require to deploy low-level
DNS sensors to access data whose collection poses practical and
privacy issues, making their adoption problematic. We propose
a mechanism that overcomes the above limitations by analyzing
DNS traffic data through a combination of linguistic and IP-based
features of suspicious domains. In this way, we are able to identify
AGD names, characterize their DGAs and isolate logical groups
of domains that represent the respective botnets. Moreover, our
system enriches these groups with new, previously unknown AGD
names, and produce novel knowledge about the evolving behavior
of each tracked botnet.
We used our system in real-world settings, to help researchers
that requested intelligence on suspicious domains and were able
to label them as belonging to the correct botnet automatically.
Additionally, we ran an evaluation on 1,153,516 domains,
including AGDs from both modern (e.g., Bamital) and traditional
(e.g., Conficker, Torpig) botnets. Our approach correctly isolated
families of AGDs that belonged to distinct DGAs, and set auto-
matically generated from non-automatically generated domains
apart in 94.8 percent of the cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnets continue to play a significant role in today’s cy-
bercrime ecosystem, and have become a commodity platform
for online lucrative activities. The latest ENISA Threat Land-
scape [13] highlighted that one of the adverse effects of this
malware-as-a-service trend is an increased number of small,
distinct botnets, which are predicted to replace traditional
large botnets: Smaller botnets are likely to fly under the radar
because of their size. This creates the problem of keeping track
of such a diverse population of distinct, yet related threats.
Furthermore, botnets are used for a variety of malicious
purposes, ranging from spamming to information stealing and
espionage.
Identifying malicious activities related to botnets is a well-
studied problem with many proposed solutions. One of the
most promising directions consists in observing and obstruct-
ing the traffic of their communication infrastructure. Typically,
the security defenders strive to find the IPs or the domain
names of the command-and-control (C&C) server of a botnet
with the goal of creating sinkholing IPs: Eventually, the bots
will starve not being able to contact their masters.
The most reliable yet easy-to-manage bot-to-master central-
ized communication mechanism relies on domain flux [20]:
Time-dependent rendezvous points via domain-generation al-
gorithms (DGAs). Each bot of a given botnet is shipped with
the same DGA, which generates a large number of time-
dependent C&C domain names the bots will contact over time.
The key concept is that, at any moment, only a small number
of domains is active and resolves to the true IPs of the C&C
server. This characteristic makes dealing with DGAs very
expensive for the security defenders, because they would need
to track—and register, in case of botnet sinkholing attempts—
several thousands of domains before finding the one used as
the rendezvous point.
Research Gaps. Researchers have proposed various ap-
proaches for finding automatically generated domains (AGDs)
with the goal of correlating this information with other datasets
(e.g., blacklists or domain reputation scores). We notice two
main shortcomings. On the one hand, the existing approaches
provide rich details on individual malicious domains (e.g., An-
tonakakis et al. [3], Bilge et al. [7]). However, they fail in
correlating distinct but related abuses of such domains. On
the other hand, the approaches that are able to automatically
correlate malicious domains to the botnets that lie behind
them (e.g., Antonakakis et al. [4]) require access to Internet
traffic whose collection poses practical and privacy issues.
More precisely, the approach by Antonakakis et al. [4] requires
visibility on the infected machines’ IP address. Besides privacy
issues, this creates the research problem of repeatability and,
more importantly, requires a low-level traffic sensor deployed
between the infected machines and the DNS servers that they
contact, with visibility of the original DNS queries. Moreover,
the accuracy of this approach may be affected by IP-sharing
(e.g., NAT) or IP-reusing (e.g., DHCP) mechanisms [20].
Proposed Approach. We propose Phoenix, which leverages
publicly available passive DNS traffic to (1) find AGDs,
(2) characterize the generation algorithms, (3) isolate logical
groups of domains that represent the respective botnets, and (4)
produce novel knowledge about the evolving behavior of each
tracked botnet. Phoenix requires no knowledge of the DGAs
active in the wild and, in particular, no reverse engineering
of the malware. Being based on recursive-level passive DNS
traffic, our approach guarantees scientific repeatability of mal-
ware experiments [18], preserves the privacy of the infected
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computers, and is not affected by any IP-sharing or IP-reusing
mechanisms in place.
Phoenix uses the output of previous work that identify
malicious domains from passive DNS monitoring; it processes
these feeds of malicious domains to recognize the typical
patterns of AGDs and build knowledge and insights about
their provenance to help botnet investigations. First, Phoenix
creates linguistic models of non-AGDs (e.g., benign domains).
Domains that violate such models are considered to be au-
tomatically generated. Then, Phoenix groups these domains
according to the domain-to-IP relations. From these groups,
Phoenix derives a generic set of fingerprints to label new
domains as belonging to some botnet. Such fingerprints are
useful to characterize the evolution of botnets, gather insights
on their activity (e.g., migrations), and identify previously
unknown C&C domain names (e.g., new blacklists).
Original Contributions. Our approach
• identifies groups of AGDs and models the characteristics
of the generation algorithms, with less requirements than
previous work; with this we ensure a) privacy-preserving
data collection, b) ease of large-scale deployment, c)
repeatable evaluation, and d) resiliency from accuracy-
affecting IP-sharing (e.g., NAT) and IP-reusing (e.g.,
DHCP) mechanisms;
• automatically associates new malicious domains to the
activity of botnets;
• builds new correlated knowledge that allow security an-
alysts to track the evolution of a DGA-based botnets.
Results. We evaluated Phoenix on 1,153,516 real-world do-
mains. Phoenix correctly isolated families of domains that
belong to different DGAs. Also, on February 9th we obtained
an undisclosed list of AGDs for which no knowledge of the
respective botnet was available. Phoenix labeled these domains
as belonging to Conficker: Further investigation eventually
confirmed that it was indeed Conficker.B. We believe that,
in addition to the comprehensive evaluation, this latter fact
proves the practicality and effectiveness of our approach.
II. AGD NAMES
Thanks to the Domain Name System (DNS), applications
and users do not need to keep track of IP addresses, but can
use human-readable aliases, called humanly generated domain
(HGD) names from hereinafter. The hierarchical structure of
the DNS protocol efficiently maintains cached copies of the
name-IP associations, so that the resolution is fast, reliable,
and highly distributed. The domain name resolution has many
uses, from load balancing to failover setups. Unfortunately,
these characteristics are useful for malicious developers, too.
Miscreants began using DNS to make centralized1 botnet
infrastructures more reliable and, more importantly, harder to
map and take down [3, 4, 10, 16, 17, 20, 23]. In particular,
1Although DNS may be used by botnets of arbitrary network topology, in
this paper we focus on centralized domain flux botnet infrastructures.
botnets rely on the DNS (also) to implement call-home func-
tionalities, such that the bots can contact their C&C server
to receive instructions, updates, or to upload stolen data. For
instance, the botnet operator, commonly referred to as the
botmaster, can change the IP address of the C&C dynamically,
by updating the DNS record, for instance when he or she
needs to migrate the C&C to other (more lenient) autonomous
systems (ASs). Similarly, the botmaster can associate short-
lived multiple IPs of infected hosts to an individual DNS
domain over time [10, 16] to improve the botnet’s redundancy,
while hiding the IP-based coordinates of a malicious host (i.e.,
the mothership).
In this context, a very effective technique to improve
centralized botnets’ resiliency to take downs and tracking is
domain flux [20], which resorts to equip a bot with DGAs.
Domain-generation Algorithms. DGAs have become the
technique of choice2 for building effective rendezvous mecha-
nisms between bots and their C&C servers: The bots of a given
botnet implement the same algorithm to generate a large and
time-dependent list of AGDs, based on pseudo-unpredictable
seeds (e.g., trending topics on Twitter, results of a Google
search). Only one of these AGDs is actually registered and
points to the true IP address of the C&C. The bots will then
generate and query all these domains, according to the DGA,
until a DNS server answers with a non-NXDOMAIN reply,
that is the IP address of the respective (existing) AGD. The key
is that only the DGA authors (or the botmasters) know exactly
when the upcoming rendezvous domain has to be registered
and activated3.
Finding “families”, or groups, of related AGDs is therefore
fundamental, because they provide valuable insights to recog-
nize, for instance, sets of botnets that implement a DGA with
common characteristics—which refer, possibly, to the same
botnet, or an evolution. Therefore, the analysts can follow the
evolution of these botnets and their (changing) C&Cs over
time, where these are hosted, and the number of machines in-
volved. The task of finding families of related AGDs, however,
is tedious and labor-intensive, although previous research has
devised mechanisms to partially automate it.
In this work, we go beyond the state of the art and observe
that instances of AGD names drawn from the same DGA can
be generalized into “fingerprint” of the generation algorithm
itself, without reversing its implementation. This boosts the
detection and classification of new, previously unknown, AGD
names, thus enriching existing blacklists with novel knowl-
edge.
Recognizing DGAs. A side effect of the DGA mechanisms
described above is that the bots will perform a disproportion-
ately large amount of DNS queries, which will result in NX-
DOMAIN replies. This happens because the vast majority of
2https://blog.damballa.com/archives/1906
3Differently from current DGAs, former forms of DGA (e.g., those based
on sequential queries of AGDs) and failure to promptly register domains have
allowed botnet takeovers in the past [20].
such queries will hit a non-existing domain. On the other hand,
legitimate hosts have no reasons to generate high volumes of
queries that yield NXDOMAIN replies. This observation has
been leveraged by Antonakakis et al. [4], who proposed to
detect DGA-based bots by correlating the clients’ IP found
in the requests and the corresponding NXDOMAIN replies at
one or more DNS resolvers. This allows to identify groups of
bots while they are attempting to find the rendezvous domain
to reach their C&C server. Also, the authors show that their
system finds families of AGDs with similar characteristics
(e.g., same upper-level domain name, lexicon or syntax),
possibly coined by the same DGA.
However, the NXDOMAIN responses alone carry little
information that can be directly used to identify the families
of AGDs. Specifically, an NXDOMAIN response only holds
the queried domain name plus some timing data. Therefore, as
also noticed by Perdisci et al. [17], the NXDOMAIN criterion
requires knowledge of the querying hosts (i.e., the bots). For
this reason, Antonakakis et al. [4] had to rely on the client
IP to group together NXDOMAINS queried by the same set
of hosts. Yadav and Reddy [21] instead group together DNS
queries originated by the same client to define the correlation
between distinct requests that target the same domains.
Drawbacks of Current Approaches. Setting aside the prob-
lem of accuracy, which really matters for systems that tell
malicious vs. benign domains apart, we notice that current
approaches impose strict requirements in terms of input data
required. Indeed, relying on the IP addresses of the querying
hosts has some drawbacks. First, it is error prone, because
no assumptions can be made on and IP-(re)assignment and
masquerading policies employed by ASs. Secondly, and more
importantly, obtaining access to this information is difficult
because it is available from DNS servers placed below the
recursive DNS level (e.g., host DNSs). This can be problem-
atic for researchers, but also for practitioners who want to
operate these systems. Last, the need for information about
the querying hosts raises privacy issues and leads to non-
repeatable experiments [18], as datasets that include these
details are not publicly available. Moreover, the requirement
constrains the deployment of detection tools to the lowest level
of DNS hierarchy, preventing a large-scale, centralized use of
the proposed defending solutions.
III. GOAL AND CHALLENGES
After considering the above motivations, we conclude that
a method to find families of AGDs yielded by the same DGAs
that requires no access to low- or top-level DNS data is
necessary.
DGA Modeling Challenges. AGDs appear completely ran-
dom at sight. Nevertheless, creating automated procedures
capable of modeling and characterizing such “randomness”
is hard, in particular when observing one domain at a time,
because one sample is not representative of the whole random
generation process. Grouping AGD samples to extract the
characteristics of the DGA is also challenging: How to group
AGDs samples together? How to avoid spurious samples that
would bias the results?
Data Collection Challenges. Collecting and dealing with
DNS traffic presents some challenges on (1) where to place
the observation point and (2) how to process the collected
data. The amount of information that can be collected varies
depending on where the sensors are deployed in the DNS
hierarchy (e.g., low-level sensors have access to the querying
hosts, but are difficult to deploy, whereas higher-level sensors
are easier to deploy but their visibility is limited to the stream
of queried domains and their IPs). Moreover, the domain-
to-IP relations are highly volatile by their nature, with both
dense and sparse connections; this impacts the space and
computation complexity of the algorithms that are needed to
analyze DNS traffic.
Lack of Ground Truth. Last, little or no ground truth is usu-
ally available regarding DGAs. When available, such ground
truth is limited to the knowledge of a specific implementation
of DGA as a result of a specific reverse engineering effort [20].
Therefore, this knowledge is outdated once released and, more
importantly, not representative of the whole domain generation
process but only of a limited view.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The following section provides a high-level overview of
Phoenix. All the system details are instead provided in § V.
Phoenix is divided into three modules (see Fig. 1). The core
of Phoenix is the DGA Discovery module, which identifies
and models AGDs by mining a stream of domains. The AGD
Detection module receives one or more domain names with
the corresponding DNS traffic, and uses the models built by the
DGA Discovery module to tell whether such domain names
appear to be automatically generated. If that is the case, this
module labels those domains with an indication of the DGA
that is most likely behind the domain generation process. The
Intelligence and Insights module aggregates, correlates and
monitors the results of the other modules to extract meaningful
insights and intelligence information from the observed data
(e.g., whether an unknown DGA-based botnet is migrating
across ASs, whether a previously unseen domain belongs to a
particular AGD family).
A. DGA Discovery Module
This module receives as input (1) a stream of domain names
that are known to be malicious and (2) a stream of DNS
traffic (i.e., queries and replies) collected above the recursive
resolvers and related to such domains. This information is
publicly accessible and can be obtained easily from (1) a
blacklist or domain reputation system (e.g., Exposure [7])
and (2) a passive and privacy-preserving DNS monitor (e.g.,
ISC/SIE [1]). The blacklists that we rely on are generated from
privacy-preserving DNS traffic too. We make no assumptions
on the type of malicious activity these domains are used
for (e.g., phishing websites, spamming campaigns or drive-by
download websites, botnet communication protocols).
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Figure 1. System overview of Phoenix. The DGA Discovery module processes the domain names from a domain reputation system and identifies interesting
AGDs. The AGD Detection module analyzes a stream of DNS traffic and recognizes the names that appear to be automatically generated. This module also
labels newly discovered AGDs as results of a particular DGA. The last module, Intelligence and Insights, provides the analyst with information useful, for
instance, to track a botnet over time, as described in §VI-D.
This module follows a 3-step pipeline to recognize domains
that are used in DGA-based botnets.
Step 1 (AGD Filtering). We extract a set of linguistic features
from the domain names. The goal is to recognize the (domain)
names that appear to be the results of automatic generations.
For instance, we distinguish between 5ybdiv.cn, which ap-
pears to be an AGD, and searchsmart.tk, which appears
to be a HGD. For ease of explanation and implementation,
Phoenix considers the linguistic features based on the English
language, as discussed in §VII.
Differently from previous work, we devised our features to
work well on single domains. Antonakakis et al. [4] and Yadav
et al. [22, 23], instead, rely on features extracted from groups
of domains, which raises the issue on how to select such
groups. The authors circumvented this problem by choosing
random groups of domains. However, there is no rigorous way
to verify the validity of such an assumption. Therefore, as part
of our contributions, we made an effort to design features that
require no groupings of domains. We make no assumptions
about the type of DGA underlying the generated domains,
although we do assume that at least one exists.
The output is a set of AGDs, possibly generated by dif-
ferent DGAs. We accomplish this using a semi-supervised
techniques, which only requires limited knowledge on HGDs
(not on existing AGDs).
Step 2 (AGD Clustering). We extract a number of IP-based
features from the DNS traffic of the domains that have passed
Step 1. We use these features to cluster together the AGDs
that have resolved to similar sets of IP addresses—possibly,
the C&C servers. These AGD clusters will partition the AGDs
according to the DNS replies observed. For example, if the
AGDs 5ybdiv.cn and hy093.cn resolved to the same
pool of IPs, we will cluster them together. Here, we assume
that AGDs generated by different DGAs are used by distinct
botnets, or distinct malware variants, or at least by different
botmasters, who have customized or tuned a DGA for their
C&C strategy. Therefore, this partitioning will, to some extent,
reflect the different groups of botnets that they have been
employed for.
Step 3 (DGA Fingerprinting). We extract a number of
features from the AGD clusters to create models that define
the fingerprints of the respective DGAs. It is worth noting that
the set of these features differs from the one identified in the
previous step, as explained in detail in the next section. The
AGD Detection module uses these fingerprints as a lookup
index to identify the type of previously unseen domains. For
instance, as clarified in the remainder of this paper, epu.org
and xmsyt.cn will match two distinct fingerprints.
B. AGD Detection Module
This module receives in input a (previously unseen) domain
name d, which can be either malicious or benign, and uses
once again the AGD Filtering step to verify whether it is
automatically generated.
The domain names that will pass this filter will undergo fur-
ther checks, which may eventually flag them as not belonging
to any AGD cluster (i.e., not matching any of the fingerprints).
Therefore, in this step, flagging as AGD a (benign) domain that
do not belong to some DGA is not a major error. It is instead
more important not to discard suspicious domains. Therefore,
for this module only, we configure the AGD Filtering step
with a looser threshold (as described in §V-A), such that we
do not discard domains that exhibit, even slightly, the linguistic
characteristics that are typical of AGDs. In other words, recall
is more important than precision in this module.
Then, this module leverages the AGD clusters and their
respective fingerprints to find the DGA, if any, that may lie
behind the previously unseen domain, d.
C. Intelligence and Insights Module
Once an AGD is labeled as such, it can be recognized among
others as belonging to a given “type” of DGA. Therefore,
the outcome of the previous modules allows the extraction of
summarized information and novel knowledge.
With this knowledge, the addresses of the C&C servers and
lists of malicious AGDs can be grouped together in small sets
that are easier to analyze than if considered into one, large
set, or distinctly. For instance, if an analyst knows that 100
domains are malicious, he or she can use the label information
to split them into two smaller sets: one that contains domain
names “similar” to 5ybdiv.cn and hy093.cn, and one
with domains “similar” to epu.org.
The notion of “similarity” is by no means based solely
on linguistic similarity: We do consider other IP- and DNS-
based features, explained next. The top level domain is also
not distinctive, we use it here as a mere example. With this
information, the analyst can track separately the evolution of
the IPs that the two groups point to and take actions. For
example, recognizing when a C&C is migrated to a new AS
or undergoing a takedown operation is easier when the set of
IPs and domains is small and the characteristics of the DGA
are known and uniform.
Generally speaking, these analyses, for which we provided
two use cases in §VI-D, can lead to high-level intelligence
observations and conjectures, useful for the mitigation of
DGA-related threats. In this, we advance the state of the art
by providing a tool that goes beyond blacklists and reputation
systems.
V. SYSTEM DETAILS
We implemented Phoenix in Python using the NumPy pack-
age, for statistical functions, and the SciPy [11] package, for
handling sparse matrices. Instead of relying entirely on exist-
ing libraries, we implemented and customized the machine-
learning algorithms described in the remainder of this section
for efficiency reasons. For this, we leveraged domain-specific
knowledge (e.g., data dimensionality).
Notation (Domain Names and Suffixes). For the purpose of
this work, a domain name is a sequence of labels separated by
dots (e.g., www.example.com). Specifically, the latter parts
form the public suffix (e.g., .com, .co.uk), under which
Internet users can register a name, which is called chosen prefix
(e.g., example). The public suffix, which is often referred
to as top-level domain (TLD), can contain more than one
label (e.g., .co.uk). The term effective TLD (eTDL) is thus
more correct. eTLDs are enumerated at http://publicsuffix.org/
to allow parsing. A domain name can be organized hierar-
chically into more subdomains (e.g., www.example.com,
ssh.example.com). We only consider the first level of a
chosen prefix, simply because a DGA that works on further
levels makes little sense, as the first level would still be the
single point of failure.
A. Step 1: AGD Filtering
In this step we make the assumption that if a domain is
automatically generated it has different linguistic features than
a domain that is generated by a human. This assumption is
reasonable because HGDs have the primary purpose of being
easily remembered and used by human beings, thus are usually
fa ac ce eb bo oo ok
S2 = 170.8109 343 438 29 118 114 45
aa aw wr rq qv
S2 = 13.24 45 17 0 0
Figure 2. 2-gram normality score S2 for facebook.com and
aawrqv.biz.
built in a way that meets this goal. On the other hand, AGDs
exhibit a certain degree of linguistic randomness, as numerous
samples of the same randomized algorithm exist. Corner cases
of this assumption are mitigated by the subsequent steps or
otherwise discussed in §VII.
1) Linguistic Features
Given a domain d and its prefix p = pd, we extract two
classes of linguistic features to build a 4-element feature vector
for each d.
LF1: Meaningful Characters Ratio. This feature models
the ratio of characters of the chosen prefix p that comprise
a meaningful word. Domains with a low ratio are likely
automatically generated.
Specifically, we split p into n meaningful subwords wi of
at least 3 symbols: |wi| ≥ 3, leaving out as few symbols as
possible:
R(d) = R(p) := max
∑n
i=1 |wi|
|p|
In the case of p = facebook, R(p) = (|face|+ |book|)/8 =
1, the prefix is fully composed of meaningful words, whereas
p = pub03str, R(p) = (|pub|)/8 = 0.375.
LF2: n-gram Normality Score. This class of features cap-
tures the pronounceability of the chosen prefix of a domain.
This problem is well studied in the field of linguistics, and
can be reduced to quantifying the extent to which a string
adheres to the phonotactics of the (English) language. The
more permissible the combinations of phonemes [6, 19], the
more pronounceable a word is. Domains with a scarce number
of such combinations are likely automatically generated.
We calculate this class of features by extracting the n-grams
of p, which are the substrings of p of length n ∈ {1, 2, 3},
and counting their occurrences in the (English) language
dictionary. The features are thus parametric to n:
Sn(d) = Sn(p) :=
∑
n-gram t in p count(t)
|p| − n+ 1
where count (t) are the occurrences of the n-gram t in the
dictionary.
Fig. 2 shows the value of S2, along with its derivation, for
one HGD and one AGD.
2) Statistical Linguistic Filter
Phoenix uses LF1-2 to build a feature vector f(d) =
[R(d), S1,2,3(d)]
T . It extracts these features from a dataset
of HGDs (Alexa top 100,000) and calculates their mean
µ =
[
R,S1, S2, S3
]T
and covariance (matrix) C, which
respectively represent the statistical average values of the fea-
tures and their correlation. Strictly speaking, the mean defines
the centroid of the HGD dataset in the features’ space, whereas
the covariance identifies the shape of the hyperellipsoid around
the centroid containing all the samples. Our filter constructs a
confidence interval, with the shape of such hyperellipsoid, that
allows us to separate HGDs from AGDs with a measurable,
statistical error that we set a priori.
The rationale is that obtaining a dataset of HGDs is straight-
forward and does not constrain the filtering to specific AGDs:
Our filter thus models non-AGDs by means of the generic
modeling of HGDs.
Distance Measurement. To tell whether a previously unseen
domain d′ resembles the typical features of HGDs, the filter
measures the distance between the feature vector f(d′) = x
and the centroid. To this end, we leverage the Mahalanobis
distance: dMah(x) =
√
(x− µ)TC−1(x− µ). This distance
has the property of (1) taking into account the correlation
between features—which is significant, because of how the
features are defined, and (2) operating with scale-invariant
datasets.
Distance Threshold. A previously unseen domain d′ is con-
sidered as automatically generated when its feature vec-
tor identifies a point that is too distant from the centroid:
dMah(x) > t. To take a proper decision we define the
threshold t as the p-percentile of the distribution of dMah(x),
where (1−p) is the fraction of HGDs that we allow to confuse
as AGDs. In this way, we can set a priori the amount of errors.
As mentioned in §IV-B, the DGA Discovery module em-
ploys a strict threshold, t = Λ, whereas the AGD Detection
module requires a looser threshold, t = λ, where λ < Λ.
Threshold Estimation. To estimate proper values for λ and
Λ, we compute dMah(x) for x = f(d),∀d ∈ DHGD,
whose distribution is plotted in Fig. 3 as ECDF. We then
set Λ to the 90-percentile and λ to the 70-percentile of that
distribution, as annotated in the figure. Fig. 4 depicts the
99%-variance preserving 2D projection of the hyperellipsoid
associated to DHGD, together with the confidence interval
thresholds calculated as mentioned above.
B. Step 2: AGD Clustering
This step receives as input the set of domains d ∈ D
that have passed Step 1. These domains are such that
dMah(f(d)) > Λ, which means that d is likely to be
automatically generated, because it is too far from the centroid
of the HGDs.
The goal of this step is to cluster domains according to their
similarity. We define as similar two domains that resolved to
similar sets of IP addresses. The rationale is that the botmaster
of a DGA-based botnet registers several domains that, at
different points in time, resolve to the same set of IPs (i.e.,
the C&C servers). To find similar domains, we represent the
domain-to-IP relation as a bipartite graph, which we convert
in a proper data structure that allows us to apply a spectral
clustering algorithm [15] that returns the groups of similar
domains (i.e., nodes of the graph).
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Figure 3. Mahalanobis distance ECDF for Alexa top 100,000 domains with
λ and Λ identification.
In this graph, two sets of node exists: K = |D| nodes
represent the domains, and L = | IPs(D)| nodes represent the
IPs. An edge exists from a node d ∈ D to node l ∈ IPs(D)
whenever a domain pointed to an IP.
1) Bipartite Graph Recursive Clustering
To cluster the domain nodes D, we leverage the DBSCAN
clustering algorithm [9], which is fast and easy to implement
in our scenario.
Data Structure. We encode the bipartite graph as a sparse
matrix M ∈ RL×K with L rows and K columns. Each cell
Ml,k holds the weight of an edge k → l in the bipartite graph,
which represents the fact that domain dk resolves to IP l. The
weight encodes the “importance” of this relation. For each IP
l in the graph, the weights Ml,k,∀k = 1, . . . ,K are set to
1
|D(l)| , where D(l) ⊂ D is the subset of domains that point to
that IP. This weight encodes the peculiarity of each IP: The
less domains an IP is pointed by, the more characterizing it
is.
Domain Similarity. At this point we calculate the matrix
S ∈ RK×K , whose cells encode the similarity between each
pair of domains d and d′. We want to consider two domains
as highly similar when they have peculiar IPs in common.
Therefore, we calculate the similarity matrix from the weights,
as S = NT · N ∈ RK×K , where N is basically M nor-
malized by columns (i.e.,
∑L
l=1Ml,k = 1,∀k = 1,K). This
similarity matrix implements the rationale that we mentioned
at the beginning of this section.
Domain Features and Clustering. We apply the DBSCAN
algorithm hierarchically. We compute the first normalized
eigenvector v from S. At this point, each domain name dk
can be represented by its feature vk, the k-th element of v,
which is fed to the DBSCAN algorithm to produce the set of
R clusters D = {D1, . . . ,DR} at the current recursive step.
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Figure 4. Principal components of the Alexa top 100,000 domains hyperel-
lipsoid with annotation of the confidence interval thresholds.
Clustering Stop Criterion. We recursively repeat the clus-
tering process on the newly created clusters until one of the
following conditions is verified:
• a cluster of domains D′ ∈ D is too small (e.g., it contains
less than 25 domains) thus it is excluded from the final
result;
• a cluster of domains has its M matrix with all the
elements greater than zero, meaning that the bipartite
graph it represents is strongly connected;
• a cluster of domains cannot be split further by the
DBSCAN algorithm with the value of  set. In our
experiments, we set  to a conservative low value of 0.1,
so to avoid the generation of clusters that contain domains
that are not similar. Manually setting this value is possible
because , and the whole DBSCAN algorithm, works on
normalized features.
The final output of DBSCAN is D? = {D1, . . . ,DR}. The
domains within each Dr are similar among each other.
2) Dimensionality Reduction
The clustering algorithm employed has a space complexity
of O(|D|2). To keep the problem feasible we randomly sample
our dataset D of AGDs into I smaller datasets Di, i = 1, . . . , I
of approximately the same size, and cluster each of them
independently, where I is the minimum value such that a
space complexity in the order of |Di|2 is affordable. Once
each Di is clustered, we recombine the I clustered sets,
D?i = {D1, . . . ,DRi}, onto the original dataset D. Note that
each Di may yield a different number Ri of clusters. This
procedure is very similar to the map-reduce programming
paradigm, where a large computation is parallelized into many
computations on smaller partitions of the original dataset, and
the final output is constructed when the intermediate results
become available.
We perform the recombination in the following post-
processing phase, which is run anyway, even if we do not
need any dimensionality reduction—that is, when I = 1 and
thus D1 ≡ D.
3) Clustering Post Processing
We post process the set of clusters of domains D?i ,∀i
with the following Pruning and Merging procedures. For
simplicity, we set the shorthand notation A ∈ D?i and B ∈ D?j
to indicate any two sets of domains (i.e., clusters) that result
from the previous DBSCAN clustering, possibly with i = j.
Pruning. Clusters of domains that exhibit a nearly one-to-
one relation with the respective IPs are considered unimportant
because, by definition, they do not reflect the concept of DGA-
based C&Cs (i.e., many domains, few IPs). Thus, we filter out
the clusters that are flat and show a pattern-free connectivity in
their bipartite domain-IP representation. This allows to remove
“noise” from the dataset.
Formally, a cluster A is removed if |IPs(A)||A| > γ, where γ is
a threshold that is derived automatically as discussed in §VI.
Merging. Given two independent clusters A and B, they are
merged together if the intersection between their respective
sets of IPs is not empty. Formally, A and B are merged if
IPs(A)∩ IPs(B) 6= ∅. This merging is repeated out iteratively,
until every combination of two clusters violates the above
condition.
The outcome of the post-processing phase is thus a set of
clusters of domains E = {E1, . . . ,EQ} where each Eq (1)
exhibits a domain-to-IP pattern and (2) is disjunct to any
other Ep with respect to its IPs. In conclusion, each cluster E
contains the AGDs employed by the same botnet backed by
the C&C servers at IP addresses IPs(E).
C. Step 3: DGA Fingerprinting
The AGD clusters identified with the previous processing
are used to extract fingerprints of the DGAs that generated
them. In other words, the goal of this step is to extract
the invariants of a DGA. We use these fingerprints in the
AGD Detection module to assign labels to previously unseen
domains, if they belong to one of the clusters.
Given a generic AGD cluster E, corresponding to a given
DGA, we extract the following cluster features:
CF1: C&C Servers Addresses. Defined as IPs(E).
CF2: Chosen Prefix Length Range. Captures the lengths of
the chosen prefix allowed for the domains in E. The boundaries
are defined as the lengths of the shortest and longest chosen
prefixes of the domains of E.
CF3: Chosen Prefix Character Set. C employed for
the chosen prefixes of the domains, defined as C :=⋃
e∈E charset(pe), where pe is the chosen prefix of e. It cap-
tures what characters are used during the random generation
of the domain names.
CF4: Chosen Prefix Numerical Characters Ratio Range.
[rm, rM ] captures the ratio of numerical characters allowed in
the chosen prefix of a given domain. The boundaries are, re-
spectively, the minimum and the maximum of num(pe)|pe| within
E, where num(pe) is the number of numerical characters in
the chosen prefix of e.
CF5: Public Suffix Set. The set of eTDL employed by the
domains in E.
To some extent, these features define the aposteriori linguistic
characteristics of the domains found within each cluster E. In
other words, they define a model of E.
D. AGD Detection Module
This module receives a previously unseen domain d and
decides whether it is automatically generated by running
the AGD Filtering step with a loose threshold λ. If d is
automatically generated, it is matched against the fingerprints
of the known DGAs on the quest for correspondences.
In particular, we first select the candidate AGD clusters
{E} that have at least one IP address in common with the IP
addresses that d pointed to: IPs(d)∩IPs(E) 6= ∅,∀E. Then, we
select a subset of candidate clusters such that have the same
features CF1–5 of d. Specifically, the length of the chosen
prefix of d, its character set, its numerical characters ratio,
and the eTLD of d must lie within the ranges defined above.
The clusters that survive this selection are chosen as the
labels of d.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Validating the results of the Phoenix is not trivial, because
it produces novel knowledge. The reason is that we do not
have a ground truth available that would allow us to strictly
validate the correctness of Phoenix quantitatively. For example,
no information is available, to our knowledge, about the
membership of a malicious domain to one family of AGDs.
If such ground truth were available, then there would be no
need for Phoenix.
In lack of an established ground truth, we proceed as
follows. We validate quantitatively the internal components of
each module (e.g., to verify that they do not produce mean-
ingless results and to assess the sensitivity of the parameters),
and qualitatively the whole approach, to make sure that it
produces useful knowledge with respect to publicly available
information.
A. Evaluation Dataset and Setup
The DGA Discovery module of Phoenix requires a feed
of recursive DNS traffic and a reputation system that tells
whether a domain is generally considered as malicious. For
the former data source, we obtained access to the ISC/SIE
framework [1], which provides DNS traffic data shared by
hundreds of different network operators. Differently from [4],
this type of traffic is privacy preserving and very easy to
collect. For the latter data source we used the Exposure [7]
blacklist, which included 107, 179 distinct domains as of
October 1st, 2012.
Differently from [22], we used AGDs merely as a ground
truth for validation, not for bootstrapping our system before
run time. More precisely, to validate the components of
Phoenix we relied on ground truth generated by publicly
available implementations of the DGAs used by Conficker [12]
and Torpig [20], which have been among the earliest and
most widespread botnets that relied on DGAs for C&C com-
munication. After Conficker and Torpig, the use of DGAs
kept rising. With these DGAs we generated five datasets of
domains, which resemble (and in some cases are equivalent to)
the domains generated by the actual botnets: 7500, 7750 and
1,101,500 distinct AGDs for the Conficker.A, Conficker.B
and Conficker.C malware, respectively, and 420 distinct AGDs
for the Torpig dataset. Moreover, we collected the list of
36,346 AGDs that Microsoft claimed in early 2013 to be related
to the activity of Bamital4.
We ran our experiments on a 4-core machine equipped with
24GB of physical memory. All the runs required execution
times in the order of the minutes.
B. DGA Discovery Validation
1) Step 1: AGD Filtering
The AGD filter is used in two contexts: by the DGA
Discovery module as a pre-clustering selection to recognize
the domains that appear automatically generated within a feed
of malicious domains, and by the AGD Detection module as
a pre-labeling selection. For pre-clustering, the strict threshold
Λ is enforced to make sure that no non-AGD domains pass
the filter and possibly bias the clustering, whereas for pre-
labeling the loose threshold λ is used to allow more domains
to be labeled. Recall that, the Labeler will eventually filter
out the domains that resemble no known AGD. We test this
component in both the contexts against the AGD datasets
of Conficker, Torpig and Bamital (that we had never seen
before).
The filter, which is the same in both the contexts, is best
visualized by means of the ECDF of the Mahalanobis distance.
Fig. 6 shows the ECDF from the AGD datasets, compared
to the ECDF from the Alexa top 100,000 domains. The plot
shows that each datasets of AGDs and HGDs have different
distribution: This confirms that our linguistic features are
well suited to perform the discrimination. Interestingly, each
AGD dataset has a distinctive distribution: Conficker and
Torpig have the same linguistic features, which differ from
the linguistic features of Bamital (and, of course, from the
non-AGD domains). We may argue that the DGAs that are
responsible of such characteristic features are also different,
whereas Conficker and Torpig rely on DGAs with very sim-
ilar linguistic characteristics. Then, we verify which fraction
of AGDs passes the filter and reaches the AGD Clustering
(Λ) step or the Labeler (λ). The results obtained are reported
in the first column of Tab. I and show that roughly half of the
domains would not contribute to the generation of the clusters:
The conservative settings ensure that only the domains that
exhibit the linguistic features more remarkably are used for
clustering. Ultimately, most of the true AGD domains will be
labeled as such before reaching the Labeler. Overall, Phoenix
4http://noticeofpleadings.com/
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Figure 5. Graph representation of the similarity matrix S during the first run of the DBSCAN clustering algorithm, as defined in §V-B1. The nodes represent
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Figure 6. Mahalanobis distance ECDF for different datasets. A KS statistical
test to compare distinct AGD distributions against the HGD distribution yields
p-values close to zero, confirming that they are drawn from diverse processes.
has a recall of 81.4 to 94.8%, which is remarkable for a non-
supervised and completely automatic approach.
2) Step 2: AGD Clustering
We ran Phoenix on our dataset and, after the first run of
the DBSCAN clustering, we obtained the similarity matrix
depicted in Fig. 5. Even with one run of the algorithm, we
can already see some interesting groups of domains that are
similar. The annotations on the figure are clarified in the
reminder of this section.
Reality Check. We searched for qualitative ground truth
that could confirm the usefulness of the clusters obtained
by running Phoenix on our dataset. To this end, we queried
Google for the IP addresses of each AGD cluster to perform
manual labeling of such clusters with evidence about the
malware activity found by other researchers.
We gathered evidence about a cluster with 33, 771 domains
allegedly used by Conficker (see also Fig. 5) and another
cluster with 3870 domains used by Bamital. A smaller cluster
of 392 domains was assigned to SpyEye, and two clusters of
404 and 58 domains, respectively, were assigned to Palevo.
We were unable to find information to label the remaining six
clusters as related to known malware.
MALWARE dMah > Λ dMah > λ
Pre-clustering selection Recall
Conficker.A 46.5% 93.4%
Conficker.B 47.2 % 93.7%
Conficker.C 52.9 % 94.8%
Torpig 34.2% 93.0%
Bamital 62.3% 81.4%
Table I
AGD PRE-CLUSTERING SELECTION AND RECALL.
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Figure 7. Clustering sensitivity from parameter γ. By studying the number
of clusters (top) and the average intra-cluster entropy over CF2, 4, 5 (bottom),
we can choose the best γ ∈ (0, 2.8).
This reality check helped us confirming that we successfully
isolated domains related to botnet activities and IP addresses
hosting C&C servers. The remainder of this section evaluates
how well such isolation performs in general settings (i.e., not
on a specific dataset).
Sensitivity From γ. We evaluated the sensitivity of the
clustering result to the γ threshold used for cluster pruning.
To this end, we studied the number of clusters generated with
varying values of γ. A steady number of cluster indicates low
sensitivity from this parameter, which is a desirable property.
Moreover, abrupt changes of the number of clusters caused by
certain values of γ can be used as a decision boundary to this
parameter. Fig. 7 shows such a change at γ = 2.8.
We also assessed how γ influences the quality of the
clustering to find safety bounds of this parameter within which
the resulting clusters do not contain spurious elements. In
other words, we want to study the influence of γ on the
cluster features calculated within each cluster. To this end,
we consider the cluster features for which a simple metric can
be easily defined: CF2 (Chosen Prefix Length Range), CF4
(Chosen Prefix Numerical Characters Ratio Range) and
CF5 (Public Suffix Set). A clustering quality is high if all the
clusters contain domains that are uniform with respect to these
features (e.g., each cluster contain elements with common
public suffix set or length). We quantify such “uniformity” as
the entropy of each features. As Fig. 7 shows, all the features
reflect an abrupt change in the uniformity of the clusters
around γ = 2.8, which corroborates the above finding.
In conclusion, values of γ outside (0, 2.8) do not allow the
clustering algorithm to optimally separate clusters of domains.
Correctness. Our claim is that the clustering can distinguish
between domains generated by different DGAs by means of
the representative IPs used by such DGAs (which are likely
to be the C&C servers). To confirm this claim in a robust
way, we evaluate the quality of the clustering with respect to
features other than the IP addresses. In this way, we can show
that our clustering tells different DGAs apart, regardless of
the IP addresses in common. In other words, we show that our
clustering is independent from the actual IP addresses used by
the botnets but it is capable of recognizing DGAs in general.
To this end, we ignore CF1 and calculate the features CF2-
5 of each cluster and show that they are distributed differ-
ently between any two clusters. We quantify this difference
by means of the p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
statistical test, which tells how much two samples (i.e., our
CF2-5 calculated for each couple of clusters) are drawn from
two different stochastic processes (i.e., they belong to two
different clusters). p-values toward 1 indicate that two clusters
are not well separated, because they comprise domains that are
likely drawn from the same distribution. On the other hand,
p-values close to zero indicate sharp separation.
The results summarized in Tab. II confirm that most of the
clusters are well separated, because their p-value is close to 0.
In particular 9 of our 11 clusters are highly dissimilar, whereas
two clusters are not distinguishable from each other (Clusters
2 and 4). From a manual analysis of these two clusters we
can argue that a common DGA is behind both of them, even
if there is no strong evidence (i.e. DNS features) of this being
the case. Cluster 2 include domains such as 46096.com
and 04309.com, whereas two samples from Cluster 4 are
88819.com and 19527.com.
C. AGD Detection Evaluation
We want to evaluate qualitatively how well the AGD Detec-
tion module is able to assign the correct labels to previously
unseen suspicious domains. To this end, we first run the
AGD Discovery module using the historical domain-to-IP
relations extracted from the ISC/SIE database for the domains
indicated as generically malicious by the malicious domain
filter (which is Exposure in our case). Once this module
produced the clusters, we validated the outcome of the AGD
Detection against another (random) split of the same type
of data extracted from the ISC/SIE dataset (never observed
before).
2 e-12
3 e-8 e-9
4 e-12 1.00 e-9
5 e-26 e-32 e-5 e-36
6 e-33 e-39 e-27 e-44 0.00
7 e-3 e-4 0.01 e-3 e-16 e-33
8 e-20 e-11 0.14 e-12 e-55 e-276 e-5
9 e-18 e-5 e-4 e-5 e-142 e-305 e-4 e-16
10 e-14 e-23 e-19 e-24 e-50 e-52 e-17 e-46 e-46
11 e-22 e-28 0.61 e-31 e-163 0.00 e-8 e-27 e-82 e-52
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Table II
THE LOW p-VALUES OF THE PAIRWISE KS TEST BETWEEN THE LENGTHS
OF THE CHOSEN PREFIX OF THE ELEMENTS WITHIN EACH COUPLE OF
CLUSTERS INDICATE THAT THE ELEMENTS OF EACH PAIR OF CLUSTERS
HAVE DIVERSE FEATURES (WE HEREBY EXEMPLIFY THE LENGTH OF THE
CHOSEN PREFIXES FOR THE PURPOSE OF VISUALIZATION). THUS, THE
CLUSTERS ARE WELL SEPARATED.
Previously unseen domains
hy613.cn 5ybdiv.cn 73it.cn 39yq.cn
69wan.cn hy093.cn 08hhwl.cn hy267.cn
hy673.cn onkx.cn xmsyt.cn fyf123.cn
watdj.cn dhjy6.cn algxy.cn g3pp.cn
Cluster 9 (Palevo)
pjrn3.cn 3dcyp.cn x0v7r.cn 0iwzc.cn
0bc3p.cn hdnx0.cn 9q0kv.cn 4qy39.cn
5vm53.cn 7ydzr.cn fyj25.cn m5qwz.cn
qwr7.cn xq4ac.cn ygb55.cn v5pgb.cn
Previously unseen domains
dky.com ejm.com eko.com blv.com
efu.com elq.com bqs.com dqu.com
bec.com dpl.com eqy.com dyh.com
dur.com bnq.com ccz.com ekv.com
Cluster 10 (Palevo)
uon.org jhg.org eks.org kxc.com
mzo.net zuh.com bwn.org khz.net
zuw.org ldt.org lxx.net epu.org
ntz.com cbv.org iqd.com nrl.net
Figure 8. Labeling of previously unseen domains (see Appendix A).
The result of the AGD Detection is a list of previously
unseen domains, assigned to a cluster (i.e., a DGA). Some
examples of previously unseen domains are depicted in Fig. 8
along with some samples of the clusters where they have been
assigned to.
These examples show that Phoenix is capable of assigning
the correct cluster to unknown suspicious domains. Indeed,
despite the variability of the eTLD, which is commonly used
as anecdotal evidence to discriminate two botnets, our system
correctly models the linguistic features and the domain-to-
IP historical relations and performs a better labeling. In the
second case the domains were all registered under .cn, and
it is also clear that they share the same generation mechanism.
D. Intelligence and Insights
In this section, we describe two use cases of the Intelli-
gence and Insights module, which provides the analyst with
valuable knowledge from the outputs of the other modules.
The correctness of the conclusions drawn from this module is
predicated on the correctness of the two upstream modules,
already discussed in prevoius sections.
Unknown DGA Recognition From Scarce Data. Our system
is designed to automatically label the malicious AGDs related
to botnet activities. This is done by using the information of the
DNS traffic related to them. Interestingly, some conclusions
can be drawn on previously unseen domains even in the
unlucky case that such information is missing (i.e., when no
DNS data is available).
While asking on mailing lists for information about sink-
holed IPs, we received an inquiry by a group of researchers
on February 9th. They had found a previously unseen list of
AGDs which resembled no known botnet. Such list was the
only information that they provided us with. Phoenix labeled
these domains with the fingerprints of a Conficker cluster. This
allowed the researchers to conduct further investigation, which
eventually confirmed that it was Conficker.B.
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Figure 9. Bamital: Migration of C&C from AS9318 to AS4766.
In conclusion, starting from the sole knowledge of a list
of malicious domains that Phoenix had never seen before, we
discovered that, according to our datasets, the only DGA able
to produce domains with that linguistic features was the DGA
associated with Conficker.
Time Evolution. Associating AGDs to the activity of a spe-
cific botnet allows to gather further information on that botnet,
by using the DGA fingerprints as a “lookup index” to make
precise queries. We can track the behavior of a botnet to study
its evolution over time.
For instance, given a DGA fingerprint or AGD sample, we
can select the domains of the corresponding cluster EDGA
and partition this set at different granularity (e.g., IPs or ASs)
by considering the exact set of IPs (or ASs) that they point
to. Given the activity that we want to monitor, for instance,
the DNS traffic of that botnet, we can then plot one time
series for each partition. In our example, we count the number
of DNS requests seen for the domains in that partition at a
certain sampling frequency (e.g., daily). The analysis of the
stacked time series generated allows to draw conclusion about
the behavior over time of the botnet. Fig. 9 shows the case of
(a) a migration (the botmaster moved the C&C servers from
one AS to another) followed by (b) a load balancing change
in the final step (the botmaster shut down 2 C&C servers thus
reducing the load balancing).
In a similar vein, Fig. 10 shows an evolution that we may
argue being a takedown operated by security defenders. In
particular, at the beginning the botnet C&C backend was dis-
tributed across three ASs in two countries (United States and
Germany). Armed with the knowledge that the IPs in AS2637
and AS1280 are operated by computer security laboratories,
we discover that this “waterfall” pattern concludes into a
sinkhole. Without knowledge of the sinkholed IPs, we could
still argue that the C&C was moved from some ASs to some
other ASs.
The aforementioned conclusions were drawn by a semi-
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Figure 10. Conficker: Evolution that resembles a C&C takedown: the C&C
had 3 IPs in AS0860 and 3 sinkholed IPs in AS2637.
automatic analysis and can be interpreted and used as novel
intelligence knowledge. The labels of the DGAs produced by
Phoenix were fundamental to perform this type of analysis.
VII. DISCUSSION
Despite the good results, Phoenix has some limitations.
Previous work leveraged NXDOMAIN responses to identify
those AGDs that the botmaster did not register yet. This allows
early detection of DGA activities, because the bots yield
overwhelming amounts of NXDOMAIN replies. Our system,
instead, requires registered AGDs to function. Therefore, it is
fed with data that takes longer collection periods. This results
in a less-responsive detection of previously unseen DGAs.
The advantage is that, differently from previous work, we
can fingerprint the DGAs and, more importantly, we lift the
observation point such that Phoenix is easier to adopt. Indeed,
we believe that not using NXDOMAIN replies represents a
strength of our work, as it makes our system profoundly
different from previous work in ease of deployment and testing
under less-constraining requirements.
The linguistic features computed on the domain names,
to decide whether they are automatically generated or not,
capture the likelihood that a given domain targets English-
speaking users. Taking into account different languages,
possibly featuring totally different sounds like Chinese or
Swedish, as well as different encondings, such as UTF8, would
pose some challenges. In particular, computing language-
independent features with a multilingual dictionary would
flatten the underlying distributions, rendering the language
features less discriminant. To tackle this limitation, a possible
solution consists in inferring the linguistic target of a given
domain (e.g, via TLD analysis or whois queries) so to evaluate
its randomness according to the correct dictionary.
Future DGAs may attempt to evade our linguistic features
by creating pronounceable AGDs. Besides the fact that, to the
best of our knowledge, no such DGAs exist, creating large
amounts of pronounceable domains is difficult: Such DGAs
would have a narrow randomization space, which violates the
design goals of domain flux [12, 20].
VIII. RELATED WORK
Botnet mitigation is a very broad topic, for which we refer
the reader to an extensive survey by Bailey et al. [5]. The
remainder of this section extends our overview of the state of
the art in §II and discusses how our work differentiates from or
advances existing techniques. We strive to include only work
that was presented at top venues.
Linguistic Features of AGDs. In this category we include
works that proposed to model AGDs by means of their lin-
guistic features. Although the idea of using linguistic features
is similar to what we use in Phoenix, the existing works are
based on supervised learning and make assumptions on how
domains should be grouped before processing.
Yadav et al. [22] were the first who addressed the problem
of AGDs, later published also in [23]: The authors leverage the
randomization of AGD names to distinguish them from HGDs.
Linguistic features capturing the distribution of alphanumeric
characters and bi-grams are computed over domain sets, which
are then classified as sets of AGDs or HGDs. Differently from
Phoenix, their system relies on supervised learning, and thus
requires labeled datasets of positive and negative samples.
The work explores different strategies to group domain in
sets before feeding them to the classifier: per-second-level-
domain, per-IP and per-component. The first strategy groups
the domains according to their second-level-domain, the sec-
ond strategy to the IPs they resolve to, the third to the bipartite
domain-IP graph components. Our work is different from these
approaches because we require no labeled datasets of AGDs
to be bootstrapped, thus it is able to find sets of AGDs with
no prior knowledge. Moreover, our system classifies domains
one by one, without the necessity of performing error-prone
apriori grouping.
DGA Analysis. In this category we include works that focus
on modeling DGAs and/or AGDs as a mean to detect botnet
activity or to expand existing blacklists of malicious domains.
Phoenix differentiates from these works by the type of knowl-
edge that it produces and by the less-demanding requirements.
Perdisci et al. [17] focused on domains that are malicious,
in general, from the viewpoint of the victims of attacks
perpetrated through botnets (e.g., phishing, spam, drive-by
download). Instead, Phoenix focuses on AGDs and, for this
reason, it models the features of the DNS layer between bots
and C&C servers. Moreover, the detection method of [17] is
based on supervised learning, whereas Phoenix uses unsuper-
vised techniques.
Neugschwandtner et al. [14] proposed a system that detects
C&C failover strategies with techniques based on multi-path
exploration. The system explores the behavior of malware
samples during simulated network failures. Backup C&C
servers and AGDs are so unveiled, leading to new blacklists.
The approach is very promising toward expanding blacklists
of malicious domains, although it may produce misleading
results when the malware behavior depends on time-dependent
information. Differently from [14], Phoenix discovers new
AGDs—and other knowledge—using solely passive, recursive-
level DNS traffic and requires no malware samples to work.
DNS Traffic Analysis. In this category we include works
that leverage features of DNS packets, at various levels of
monitoring, as a mean to find new malicious domains. Phoenix
differentiates from these works by the type of new knowl-
edge inferred and by the less-demanding learning technique
adopted.
Bilge et al. [7] proposed Exposure, a large-scale, passive
DNS analysis technique to detect domains associated with
malicious activities, including botnet C&C. The technique
is based on the observation that malicious domains exhibit
peculiar DNS behaviors. 15 features, ranging from time series
to TTL values-based features, are computed and used to feed
a classifier trained with real-world labelled data. The main
shortcoming is that Exposure needs a labeled dataset of known
malicious domains for training a supervised classifier. Instead,
Phoenix uses a small feed of malicious domains to infer
novel knowledge (i.e., to find AGDs from generally malicious
domains). Instead of training a classifier on malicious domains,
we calculate thresholds for our filters based on benign—or, at
least, human-generated—domains.
Systems like Exposure and Notos [2] rely on local recursive
DNS. Instead, Kopis [3] analyzes DNS traffic collected from
a global vantage point at the upper DNS hierarchy. Kopis
introduces new features such as the requester diversity, re-
quester profile and resolved-IPs reputation, to leverage the
global visibility and detect malicious domains. As the authors
themselves notice, Kopis is ineffective on AGDs, because of
their short lifespan, whereas we have showed extensively that
Phoenix can detect and, more importantly, label, previously
unknown AGDs.
Bilge et al. [8] proposed DISCLOSURE, a system that
detects C&C communications from NetFlow data analysis.
Using NetFlow data overcomes the problems of gathering
raw network traffic and of large-scale processing. However,
NetFlow poses challenges on how to use such summa-
rized information—which, for instance, includes no packet
payload—to tell legitimate and C&C traffic apart. Therefore,
DISCLOSURE could be used to discover domains that are
malicious only for the fact of being involved in C&C com-
munication, with no indication of the DGA, if any, behind
them. Instead, Phoenix focuses exclusively on characterizing
the emerging use of DGAs in C&C traffic.
Exploiting NX domains. In this category we include works
that exploit the fact that machines (i.e., bots) infected by
DGA-based malware cause the host-level DNS servers to
generate disproportionately large numbers of NX responses.
In particular, Yadav and Reddy [21] extend [22] and introduce
NXDOMAINs to speedup the detection of AGDs: registered
AGDs are recognized because they are queried by any given
client after a series of NXDOMAIN responses. The work
differs from ours substantially, mainly because it requires
DNS datasets that include the IP addresses of the querying
clients. Moreover, the approach seems fragile on sampled
datasets, which is a required step when dealing with high-
traffic networks.
IX. CONCLUSION
According to our extensive evaluation, Phoenix can (1)
discover (previously unknown) DGAs by telling AGDs and
HGDs apart, (2) detect previously unknown AGDs, and (3)
provide insightful intelligence (e.g., the tracking and moni-
toring of DGA-based C&C domains over time). We improve
the linguistic features proposed in [23] and combine them
with other features drawn from publicly available DNS traffic.
We obtained a series of unsupervised classifiers. A known
limitation of unsupervised classifiers is that they are opaque;
in other words, they do not provide any feedback about the
decisions that they draw. We overcame this limitation by
calculating fingerprints of the domains identified by Phoenix
as belonging to a group of “similar” AGDs.
Contrary to the existing methods based on NX domains,
our approach does not rely on clients’ IPs, it is not affected
by NAT and DHCP leases nor it requires specific deployment
contexts. Indeed, Phoenix takes recursive-level DNS traffic as
input, which is abundant and easily accessible by researchers
and practitioners, and a small blacklist of malicious domains,
which is also easy to obtain.
Despite the known limitations, highlighted in §VII, which
provide directions for further research, we successfully used
Phoenix in real-world settings to identify a list of suspicious
domains as belonging to a live botnet (based on Conficker.B).
We believe that, in addition to the comprehensive evaluation,
this latter fact proves the practicality and effectiveness of our
approach.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A representative excerpt of the clustering produced by
Phoenix from our dataset.
Cluster 6 (Bamital)
50e7f66b0242e579f8ed4b8b91f33d1a.co.cc
bad61b6267f0e20d08154342ef09f152.co.cc
62446a1af3f85b93f4eef982d07cc492.co.cc
0d1a81ab5bdfac9c8c6f6dd4278d99fb.co.cc
f1dad9a359ba766e9f5ec392426ddd30.co.cc
295e2484bddd43bc43387950a4b5da16.co.cc
501815bd2785f103d22e1becb681aa48.co.cc
341af50eb475d1730bd6734c812a60a1.co.cc
49b24bf574b7389bd8d5ba83baa30891.co.cc
a7e3914a88e3725ddafbbf67444cd6f8.co.cc
Cluster 9 (Palevo)
7cj1b.cn ff88567.cn ef44ee.cn
fwjp0.cn 0bc3p.cn 9i230.cn
3dcyp.cn azeifko.cn fyyxqftc.cn
hfju38djfhjdi3kd.cn
Cluster 10 (Palevo)
ewn.net wyp.net ews.net kpk.net
khz.net uon.org lxx.net kxc.com
yhv.com nrl.net
Cluster 11 (Conficker)
byuyy.biz jbkxbxublgn.biz
kpqzk.org tcmsrdm.org
lvzqxymji.org fbhwgmb.info
aeyyiujxs.org psaehtmx.info
vdrmgyxq.biz mmdbby.biz
